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GENDER BASED AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: A
JOURNEY THAT HAS ONLY JUST BEGUN
I. INTRODUCTION
When the Court handed down Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,'
it made a bold statement by applying the strict scrutiny standard2 to
federal affirmative action programs3 that use racial or ethnic selections
criteria.4 However, the Court did not discuss the constitutional standard
1. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
2. Strict scrutiny requires that "racial classifications ... serve a compelling
governmental interest, and must be narrowly tailored to further that interest." Id. at 2117.
See also City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) ("[IThe purpose
of strict scrutiny is to 'smoke out' illegitimate uses of race by assuring that the legislative
body is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect tool.").
3. President Johnson issued Executive Order 11,246 requiring businesses contracting
with the federal government to implement affirmative action programs. Executive Order
11,375, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965). Although Order 11,246 made no reference to sex,
Executive Order 11,375 amended Order 11,246 to prohibit sex discrimination. Executive
Order 11,375, 3 C.F.R. 684 (1966-1970). Under Johnson's Executive Order, an organi-
zation could be denied a federal contract or have its existing contracts terminated simply
because it failed to show active attempts to enhance the number or status of protected
groups within the organization. The Executive Order did not require that anyone lodge
a complaint in order for action to be expected or required. The divergence between
legislative and executive law gives some explanation to the inconsistency that court-made
law has shown in affirmative action cases.
4. In doing so, Adarand explicitly overruled Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497
U.S. 547, 565 (1990), which held federal racial classifications need only satisfy
intermediate scrutiny even though state racial classifications must satisfy strict scrutiny.
Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2113.
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of review for gender-based affirmative action.5
Presently, lower courts apply two different standards of review to
gender-based affirmative action programs: intermediate scrutiny6 and
strict scrutiny.7 Courts which apply the intermediate standard find
support in cases handed down in the early 1980's.8 Alternatively, courts
which apply a strict scrutiny standard9 rely on the 1989 Supreme Court
decision of City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co."0  Although both
standards prevail throughout the lower courts, recent decisions indicate
a trend towards the strict scrutiny standard in gender-based affirmative
action cases."
The application of the strict scrutiny standard to gender-based
affirmative action may be detrimental to women.'2 The application of
strict scrutiny may eliminate many programs which promote the
advancement of women. 3 This Section examines the post-Adarand
viability of gender-based affirmative action claims. Part 11 defines
affirmative action and sketches the evolution of race-based affirmative
action programs under Title VII and equal protection analysis. Part III
examines the effect of equal protection analysis on gender-based
affirmative action. Part IV examines how far women have advanced in
the work force and the necessity of affirmative action based on gender.
5. See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. 2097.
6. The intermediate or middle level of scrutiny requires the gender-based classification
to be substantially related to the achievement of an important governmental objective.
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). The Court must strike the statute if the gender-
based criterion is not substantially related to an important governmental objective even if
the criterion favors women and is enacted solely to remedy past anti-female discrimination.
See also Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987); Califano v. Webster, 430
U.S. 313 (1977).
7. See inffra notes 63-79 and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., Concrete Works of Colorado v. City and County of Denver, 36 F.3d 1513,
1519 (10th Cir. 1994) (relying on Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718,
723-34 & n.9 (1982)); Ensley Branch, NAACP v. Jefferson County, 31 F.3d 1548, 1579
(11th Cir. 1994) (same); Contractors Ass'n v. City of Philadelphia, 6 F.3d 990, 999 (3d
Cir. 1993) (same).
9. See, e.g., Vogel v. City of Cincinnati, 959 F.2d 594, 599 (6th Cir. 1992) (requiring
the City's plan to "pass muster pursuant to this strict scrutiny standard").
10. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
11. See infra notes 63-79 and accompanying text.
12. See infra part V.
13. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 505 (1989) (rejecting a
racial-based affirmative action plan under the strict scrutiny standard).
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Part V applies the strict scrutiny standard to gender-based affirmative
action and demonstrates the effect it will have on women in the work
force. In addition, Part V concludes that the courts should not apply the
strict scrutiny standard to gender-based affirmative action plans.
II. THE DEFINITION AND EVOLUTION OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
Affirmative action is an attempt to equalize the opportunity for
women and racial minorities by explicitly taking into account their
defining characteristics--sex or race-which has been the basis for
discrimination. 4 Affirmative action is a positive measure taken by
employers to remedy past discrimination against a class of individuals
sharing a common characteristic. 5 An employee can challenge an
affirmative action plan as a Title VII violation or as a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment.' 6 However, the courts
apply a different standard depending on whether the employee challenges
the plan under Title VII or the Equal Protection Clause. 7
A. Title VII Standard
In United Steelworkers of America v. Weber,'" the Court permitted
an employer to consider the employee's race when making employment
decisions. 9 In it's opinion, the Court examined Congress' purpose
when it enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964,20 and concluded that
Congress did not intend Title VII to prohibit affirmative action plans.2'
Congress enacted title VII to prohibit racial discrimination and to "open
employment opportunities for ... [African-Americans.]"' The Court
14. Thomas Mullen, Affirmative Action, in THE LEGAL RELEVANCE OF GENDER, 244-
66 (Sheila McLean and Noreen Burrows eds., 1988).
15. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 197 (1979) (holding that
Title VII does not prohibit employers from taking "race-conscious steps to eliminate
manifest racial imbalances in traditionally segregated job categories").
16. Cunico v. Pueblo Sch. Dist. No. 60, 917 F.2d 431, 436-37 (10th Cir. 1990). The
Equal Protection Clause reads: "No State shall ... deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
17. Cunico, 917 F.2d at 437.
18. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
19. Id. at 209.
20. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1994).
21. Weber, 443 U.S. at 200-04.
22. Id. at 203.
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determined that Congress intended "employers ... to self-examine and
to self-evaluate their employment practices and ... to eliminate" racial
discrimination.'
Although Weber did not define a permissible affirmative action plan,
the Court considered several factors.24 First, whether the employer
enacted the plan in order to correct past discrimination patterns.25
Second, whether the plan "trammel[ed] the interests of the white
employees." '26 Finally, whether the plan was a temporary measure
designed to eliminate a racial imbalance.2
B. Race-Based Equal Protection Clause Claims
In addition to challenging an affirmative action plan under Title VII,
a plaintiff may also challenge the plan under the Equal Protection Clause.
The Supreme Court, however, has failed to clearly articulate a standard
for reviewing such claims. Prior to Adarand, the Court had adopted
different levels of scrutiny for race-based affirmative action claims.28
In its various opinions, the Court applied strict scrutiny for state and
local government race-based affirmative action plans29 and intermediate
scrutiny for federal government actions."
The Court first addressed affirmative action in Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke.3 Bakke involved a challenge to a
state medical school's admissions program of University of California at
23. Id. at 204.
24. Id. at 208.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. See also Cunico v. Pueblo Sch. Dist. No. 60, 917 F.2d 431, 437 (10th Cir.
1990) (applying Weber).
28. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2108-13 (1995)
(discussing the evolution of race-based affirmative action claims under the Equal
Protection Clause).
29. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Wygant v.
Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980);
University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). See also Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at
2108-13.
30. See, e.g., Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990), overruled by,
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
31. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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Davis Medical School.32 The program ensured the admission of a
specified number of minority students. Bakke, a white male applicant,
claimed the admissions program violated the Equal Protection Clause. 4
A divided Court struck down the University's plan in the first of many
four-to-five decisions on affirmative action.35 Although unable to agree
on a basis for its decision, five justices agreed that any racial or ethnic
classification, regardless of its purpose, must be subject to strict
scrutiny. 36 Thus, the admissions program could employ race as a "plus"
factor but could not exclude applicants solely because of their race.37
Essentially, the University could not use an applicant's race as the sole
reason for selecting that individual without comparing that applicant with
other applicants.38
Since Bakke, the Supreme Court has consistently subjected state-
implemented affirmative action programs containing race-based
preferences to strict scrutiny.39 In Wygant v. Jackson Board of Educa-
tion,4 the Court addressed whether the Jackson Board of Education
could grant preferential protection against layoffs to some of its
32. Id. at 272-75.
33. Id. at 275. The admissions procedure reserved a fixed number of seats in each
entering class for disadvantaged minority students. Id. Only Afican Americans, Latin
Americans, Native Americans, and Asian-Americans could compete for these places. Id.
at 289. In addition, the admissions officers attempted to fill the fixed number of seats with
persons who were also victims of racial discrimination. Id. at 275.
34. Id. at 278.
35. Id. at 319-20.
36. Id. at 289-91.
37. Id. at 317. Justice Powell's application of the traditional strict standard required
that the Court could only uphold a suspect classification if (1) its objective was
"permissible and substantial," and (2) the classification employed was "necessary" to
accomplish that objective. Id. at 305 (quoting In re Griffiths, 413, U.S. 717, 721-22
(1973)). Powell further held that remedying past discrimination (i.e., affirmative action)
justified such classifications only where explicit judicial, legislative or administrative
findings revealed specific constitutional or statutory violations. Id. at 307-09.
However, Powell did find the University's asserted objective of an ethically diverse
student body a permissible constitutional goal so long as it was merely one factor in the
admissions process. Id. at 311-18.
38. Id. at 317.
39. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Wygant v.
Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S 267 (1986).
40. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
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employees based on race or national origin.4 In a five-to-four decision,
the Court applied strict scrutiny and declared the layoff protection
program unconstitutional. 2 The Board adopted the agreement in order
to provide the minority students with minority role models. 3 Justice
Powell, however, held the Board's attempt to overcome societal
discrimination was not a compelling state interest." Rather, the Board
had to establish that it had engaged in prior discrimination before it
could use racial classifications to remedy that discrimination. 5
Finally, in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Company,46 the
majority of the Court rejected race-based remedies implemented by the
City of Richmond in the absence of proof the City itself had discriminat-
ed against minorities.47 The City of Richmond designed a minority set-
aside program which required a fixed percentage of publicly funded
construction projects to be set aside for minority-owned business. 48
Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor stated the Court must subject
state and local race-based affirmative action programs to strict scruti-
ny.49 As a result of this decision, if a local governmental body wants
to pursue a race-conscious remedial plan, the local legislature must prove
41. Id. at 270. In Wygant, the school board and the teachers' union negotiated a
collective bargaining agreement which provided that when layoffs were required, the Board
would retain teachers with the most seniority "except that at no time will there be a greater
percentage of minority personnel laid off that the current percentage of minority personnel
employed at the time of the layoff." Id. at 270. As a result of this agreement, the Board
laid offnonminority teachers and retained minority teachers with less seniority. Id. at 272.
The nonminority teachers alleged the agreement violated both the Equal Protection Clause
and Title VII. Id.
42. Id. at 279-80, 283-84.
43. Id. at 274.
44. Id. at 274-76.
45. Id. at 274. But see Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers Assoc. v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421
(1986) (holding that Title VII relief is not limited to actual victims of prior discrimination
but could instead benefit those who were not themselves actual victims).
46. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
47. Id. at 498-99. But see Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 485 (1980) ("[l]t was
within congressional power to act on the assumption that in the past some nonminority
businesses may have reaped competitive benefit over the years from the virtual exclusion
of minority firms from these contracting opportunities."), overruled by, Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
48. Croson, 488 U.S. at 477-78.
49. Id. at 509-11.
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the presence of past discrimination."
The Supreme Court, however, in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v.
FCC, applied a different level of scrutiny to federal race-based
programsY In it's opinion, the Court held that "benign race-conscious
measures mandated by Congress"53 were constitutional as long as the
program served an important governmental objective and were substan-
tially related to the objective.' In other words, Metro Broadcasting
applied intermediate scrutiny to a federal race-conscious program."
In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,56 the Supreme Court
overruled Metro Broadcasting and held all federal, state, and local race-
based affirmative action programs subject to strict scrutiny. 7 Adarand
involved a federal program giving general contractors on government
projects financial incentives to hire subcontractors controlled by "socially
and economically disadvantaged individuals.""8  A nonminority
subcontractor alleged the program violated the equal protection provision
of the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause. 9 Rather than applying
the intermediate scrutiny, the Court held all racial classifications imposed
50. Id. Cf. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 563-66 (1990) (holding
a federal race-conscious measure must satisfy intermediate scrutiny, not the strict scrutiny
required of state and local governments under Croson), overruled by, Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
51. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
52. Id. at 563-66.
53. Id. at 564.
54. Id. at 565.
55. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2112 (1995).
56. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
57. Id. at 2113. In her majority opinion, O'Connor declined to follow Metro
Broadcasting because it departed from prior cases in two ways. Id. at 2112. First, Metro
Broadcasting rejected Croson's argument that strict scrutiny is essential because of the
difficulty of determining what classifications are "benign" or "remedial" and what
classifications are motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or politics. Id.
Second, Metro Broadcasting rejected a consistent standard between state and federal racial
classifications. Id.
58. Id. at 2102. The program defined socially and economically disadvantaged indi-
viduals as "'Black Americans, Hispanic Americans, Native Americans, Asian Pacific
Americans, and other minorities, or any other individual found to be disadvantaged by the
[Small Business] Administration pursuant to section 8(a) of the Small Business Act."' Id.
at 2102 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 637(d)(2),(3) (1994)).
59. Id. at 2101. Adarand was not awarded a subcontract despite submitting the lowest
bid. Id. at 2102.
19961
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by any federal, state, or local actor must be analyzed under strict
scrutiny.'
III. EQUAL PROTECTION AND GENDER-BASED
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PROGRAMS
The Supreme Court limited the holdings in Croson and Adarand to
race-based affirmative action programs and provided little insight as to
whether the standard should apply to gender-based programs.6' As a
result, the lower courts are split over the proper level of scrutiny
applicable in gender-based affirmative action programs.62
A. Strict Scrutiny
Courts relying on Croson apply the same level of scrutiny to
gender-based and race-based preferences. In Vogel v. City of Cincin-
nati,6' the Sixth Circuit applied strict scrutiny to a gender-based
affirmative action program in the City of Cincinnati police depart-
ment.64 In Vogel, a male nonminority applicant alleged the hiring
preferences in the program violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights.61
In upholding the program, the Sixth Circuit relied on Croson and applied
60. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2113.
61. In his dissent, Justice Marshall was willing to predict the Court's response to the
future of gender-based classifications. He stated:
If the majority really believes that groups like Richmond's nonminorities, which
constitute approximately half the population but which are outnumbered even
marginally in political fora, are deserving of suspect class status for these reasons
alone, this Court's decisions denying suspect status to women, ... stand[s] on
extremely shaky ground.
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 554 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
62. Compare Concrete Works of Colorado, Inc. v. City and County of Denver, 36 F.3d
1513, 1519 (10th Cir. 1994) (applying intermediate scrutiny) with Vogel v. City of
Cincinnati, 959 F.2d 594 (6th Cir. 1992) (applying strict scrutiny).
63. 959 F.2d 594 (6th Cir. 1992).
64. Id. at 599. The program was pursuant to a court approved consent decree entered
into by the Department of Justice and the City after the Department brought a Title VII
suit against the City. Id. at 596. The suit alleged the City's hiring and promotion
practices discriminated against blacks and women. Id.
65. Id. at 597. The hiring procedure required all applicants, regardless of race or sex,
to score at least 60% on a written examination. Id. at 596. At that point, the city used
gender and race-based hiring preferences to achieve statistical goals set by the consent
decree. Id. at 596-97.
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the same level of scrutiny to race and gender-based preferences. 6
Vogel considered the language in Croson which states: "[t]he level of
scrutiny does not change merely because the challenged classification
works against a group that historically has not been subject to govern-
mental discrimination."67
The Northern District of Texas was the first court to apply strict
scrutiny after Adarand in Dallas Fire Fighters Ass'n v. City of Dallas.
In Dallas Fire Fighters, white and Native American male fire fighters
claimed race and gender-conscious promotions violated the Equal
Protection Clause. 9 The plaintiffs claimed the department passed them
over for promotions solely on the basis of race or gender pursuant to the
Department's affirmative action plan.7" The court held the constitution-
ality of an affirmative action plan, whether voluntary or court-ordered,
must be subjected to strict scrutiny.7 The court found that the City's
policy of "skip promotions" in the fire department was not narrowly
tailored and therefore violated the plaintiff's equal protections rights.72
Although the complaint alleged gender and race-based classifications, the
court's analysis focused on the race-based remedial measures."
However, the decision neither states that strict scrutiny does not apply to
gender-based programs, nor does it suggest an applicable alternative
scrutiny.
In Mallory v. Harkness,7 the court for the Southern District of
Florida applied strict scrutiny in striking down a Florida statute.75 In
Mallory, a white male brought an equal protection claim against the
66. Id. at 599-600. In upholding the program, the court relied on statistics which
showed low levels of minority and female employment in the relevant positions. Id. at
600.
67. Vogel, 959 F.2d at 599 (citing JA. Croson, 488 U.S. at 494).
68. 885 F. Supp. 915 (N.D. Tex. 1995).
69. Id. at 919.
70. Id. at 918-19. The Department's Affirmative Action program provided promotions
for minorities who scored lower on department exams than non-minorities. Id. at 918 n.l.
71. Id. at 920-21. The Court did not rely on Adarand in reaching this conclusion but
instead relied on City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) and Wygant
v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986). Dallas Fire Fighters, 885 F. Supp. at 921.
72. Dallas Fire Fighters, 885 F. Supp. at 923.
73. Id. at 921.
74. 895 F. Supp. 1556 (S.D. Fla. 1995).
75. Id. at 1559-62.
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Judicial Nominating Committee for Florida's Fourth District Court of
Appeal after the Committee refused to consider his application because
he was not a woman or a minority.76 The court determined that the
Florida Statute violated the Fourteenth Amendment because it imposed
absolute gender and race-based qualifications." Applying strict
scrutiny, the court found the defendants failed to assert a compelling
state interest to justify infringing upon the plaintiff's equal protection
rights.78 Moreover, the court held that even if it found a compelling
interest, the program would not survive strict scrutiny because the statute
was not narrowly tailored to serve its purpose. 9
B. Intermediate Scrutiny
Courts applying intermediate scrutiny argue that Croson only
involved racial classifications and therefore does not apply to gender
classifications." In Concrete Works of Colorado v. City and County of
Denver,"' the Tenth Circuit applied the intermediate scrutiny standard
to a public works ordinance enacted by the City of Denver." The
ordinance required the Office on Contract Compliance (OCC) to set aside
a percentage of each public works contract to minority business
76. Id. at 1558. The court rejected the plaintiff's application based upon a Florida
statute which required that one third of the Judicial Nominating Committee seats be filled
by women or by a racial or ethnic minority. Id. The court held that the statute imposed
an outright ban on the plaintiff's right to seek a particular state public office because of
his race or his gender. Id. at 1559. The Judicial Nominating Committee has the duty to
receive and review applications forjudicial vacancies and make at least three recommenda-
tions from which the governor may select and appoint a judge. Id. at 1558.
77. Id. at 1558.
78. Id. at 1559-60. The court rejected the defendants claimed promoting diversity, and
reasoned that such an interest had not been recognized outside academia. Id. at 1560. The
court also noted that Bakke specifically rejected the diversity argument when based solely
on race or gender. Id.
79. Id. at 1560. The court reasoned that the race and gender quota did not advance
the stated goals with any degree of precision or certainty. Id. at 1560-61. The court found
that the statute treated minorities and women alike. Id. Reasoning that such a system
could result in appointees from one protected class squeezing out another, the court found
the quotas were not necessary to serve the statute's objective. Id. at 1561.
80. See Concrete Works of Colorado v. City and County of Denver, 36 F.3d 1513,
1519 (10th Cir. 1994).
81. 36 F.3d 1513 (10th Cir. 1994).
82. Id. at 1519. The City enacted the ordinance to remedy perceived race and gender
discrimination in the awarding of public construction contracts. Id. at 1516.
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enterprises (MBE)83 and women-owned business enterprises (WBE).84
A nonminority and male-owned construction firm challenged the
ordinance on Equal Protection grounds. 5 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit
applied strict scrutiny to the race-based preferences, citing Croson, but
applied intermediate scrutiny to the gender-based preferences.86
After Adarand, the District Court of the Middle District of Alabama
applied intermediate scrutiny in Shuford v. Alabama State Board of
Education." In Shuford, black citizens and female educators claimed
they were denied promotions in Alabama's post secondary educational
system based upon their class membership." In ruling on a consent
decree, the court held the Equal Protection Clause required a different
level of scrutiny for sex than for race.89 The court applied strict
scrutiny to the race-conscious relief in the decree and intermediate
scrutiny to the sex-conscious relief.9'
IV. GENDER BASED AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND
THE FEMALE WORK FORCE
Women in the work force, particularly in jobs considered to be
male-dominated, do not receive equal treatment.9 A full-time working
woman earns approximately three-quarters of a man's salary.92 At least
forty percent of this gap is the result of the concentration of women in
83. The ordinance defined minority as: "person[s] of Black, Hispanic, Asian American
or American Indian decent." Id. at 1515 n.l.
84. Id. at 1515-16. Bidders could satisfy a project's goal by: (1) demonstrating they
are certified MBE or WBE; (2) forming a joint venture with a certified MBE or WBE; or
(3) enlisting MBE or WBE as subcontractors or suppliers. Id. at 1516.
85. Id. at 1517. The firm claimed failure to comply with the participation of the
ordinance caused it to lose three construction contracts. Id.
86. Id. at 1519 (citing Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723-27
(1982)).
87. 897 F. Supp 1535 (M.D. Ala. 1995).
88. Id. at 1543.
89. Id. at 1550 (citing Ensley Branch, NAACP v. Seibels, 31 F.3d 1548, 1579-80 (1 1th
Cir. 1994)).
90. Id.
91. See generally Benjamin T. Isbell, Gender Inequality and Wage Differentials
Between the Sexes: Is it Inevitable or Is there an Answer, 50 WASH. U. J. URB. &
CONTEMP. L. _ (1996).
92. UNITED STATES DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES 433 (1995).
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low paying jobs.9' Indeed, men earn more than women in every
occupation--even in predominantly female jobs.94 Part IV discusses
why this wage-disparity exists, and how affirmative action can play a
role to effectuate that change.
Two dominant theories attempt to explain the roots of discrimination
in the work force. First, the conventional theory attributes the above
disparities to socialization.95 This theory posits that because women
have domestic and child rearing responsibilities, they are not brought up
to be aggressive and ambitious and thus are not as well suited for
advancement in the workforce.' In addition, the conventional theory
argues traditional cultural roles cause the disparity in wages between men
and women. 97 Finally, the conventional theory argues employers pay
women less because they assume women are supported by their
families.98
The second theory argues organizational dynamics such as gender
discrimination and sexual harassment, not socialization, cause the lack of
occupational success.' A "glass ceiling" prevents women from
reaching the top positions."° At the same time, men experience the
93. BARBARA RESKIN & HEIDI HARTMANN, WOMEN'S WORK, MEN'S WORK: SEX
SEGREGATION ON THE JOB 10-12 (1986).
94. CATHERINE MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 24-25 (1987).
95. See JERRY A. JACOBS, REVOLVING DOORS: SEX SEGREGATION AND WOMEN'S
CAREERS 37-63 (1989) (discussing the social control approach).
96. Id.
97. See id.
98. ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, A WOMAN'S WAGE: HISTORICAL MEANINGS AND
SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES (1990). The disparity in wages reflects the long-standing cultural
tradition that men are the bread winners of the family. Historically, employers paid
different wages to male and female workers because the employers believed men needed
more money than women because they had to support their families. Id. Therefore,
women were originally recruited into jobs such as teaching, nursing and library science,
because civic leaders believed the women did not "need" the money. Many employers
still hold this belief today. CHRISTINE L. WILLIAMS, STILL A MAN'S WORLD: MEN WHO
Do "WOMEN'S WORK" 159-160 (1995).
99. See generally WILLIAMS, supra note 98, at 6.
100. Pamela M. Prah, Women: OFCCP, Other Programs Expected to Meet Strict
Affirmative Action Test, Aide Says, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) 141 (July 24, 1994). "Glass
ceiling" refers to the notion that women reach an invisible barrier to promotion in their
careers. In March of 1995, the Glass Ceiling Commission released a fact-finding report
which reveled that 97% of the senior managers in Fortune 1,000 industries and Fortune
500 companies were white males. Id.
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"glass escalator" which makes it difficult for them to avoid promotion in
the work place despite their own intent.'
Regardless of which theory one adheres to, occupational sex
segregation presents a major problem for working women. It contributes
to the income gap between men and women, 02 it perpetuates gender
stereotypes"0 3 and it impedes women from pursuing some of the most
powerful and fulfilling careers in our society."
101. WILLIAMS, supra note 98, at 87 (noting that one must work harder to remain in
one place while on a moving escalator). Men often have difficulty understanding the
notion of glass ceiling since they rarely experience gender discrimination in the work place
which affects their ability to excel. See generally CYNTHIA F. EPSTEIN, WOMEN IN THE
LAW (1981); JACOBS, supra note 95; ROSABETH M. KANTER, MEN AND WOMEN OF THE
CORPORATION (1977); SUSAN E. MARTIN, BREAKING AND ENTERING: POLICEWOMEN ON
PATROL (1980); BARABRA RESKIN & PATRICIA Ross, JOB QUEUES, GENDER QUEUES:
EXPLAINING WOMEN'S INROADS INTO MALE OCCUPATIONS (1990) (discussing women in
male-dominated professions). Even more, men in female-dominated professions such as
nursing and teaching do not have the same experiences as do females in male-dominated
professions. While men may experience discrimination in female-dominated professions,
the discrimination tends to work in their favor. Management typically promotes these men
from service positions to more lucrative administrative positions thought to be more
"appropriate" for male employees. See, CAROL T. SCHREIBER, CHANGING PLACES: MEN
AND WOMEN IN TRANSITIONAL OCCUPATIONS (1979); CHRISTINE L. WILLIAMS, DOING
"WOMEN'S WORK": MEN IN NONTRADITIONAL OCCUPATIONS (1993); CHRISTINE L.
WILLIAMS, GENDER DIFFERENCES AT WORK: WOMEN AND MEN IN NONTRADITIONAL
OCCUPATIONS (1989); WILLIAMS, supra note 98 (offering a more in depth discussion of
men in female-dominated professions).
102, See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text. Cross-sectional studies show that
gender differences in salary do not disappear when factors such as education, experience,
and training are controlled: the amount of increase in salary that a year's education or on-
the-job training experience brings is greater for a man than for a woman. See generally
BARBARA R. BERGMAN, THE ECONOMIC EMERGENCE OF WOMEN (1986).
103. See Isbell, supra note 91, at _.
104. Women occupy an inequitable position in all types of organizations. For
example, women comprise 3% of top management positions; in academic settings women
are much less likely than men to hold tenured, tenure track or full-time positions; women
comprise only 8.6% of the country's engineers; 3.9% of airplane pilots and navigators; less
than 1% of carpenters; 15% of elected officials; and 16% of physicians. While women
comprise 48% of the journalists, they hold only 6% of the top jobs in journalism. Judith
Applebaum, Uprooting Gender-Based Discrimination, CONN. LAW TRIB., May 8, 1995,
at 23; SUSAN D. CLAYTON & FAYE J. CROSBY, JUSTICE, GENDER AND AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION 9 (1992).
Women are also disadvantaged in the field of law. See Judge Judith S. Kaye, Women
Lawyers in Big Firms: A Study in Progress Towards Gender Equality, 57 FORDHAM L.
REV. 111 (1988). Moreover, few women partners in large firms rise to leadership level
in their firms. Even as partners, women report that they hit the glass ceiling. Room at the
top is often reserved for rainmakers; men have been more effective rainmakers than
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However, since 1965, affirmative action has improved the economic
position of women. 5 The increase in the percentage of women in the
workforce and the reaction that is given to complaints of discrimination
reflect improvement."c Moreover, empirical data supports the effec-
tiveness of affirmative action. In a survey conducted in private and
public companies, management was presented with a hypothetical person
whose sex, race and various characteristics were manipulated systemati-
cally. 7 The study asked management to assign that hypothetical
person a job based on the given characteristics. 8 While the results
showed black female college graduates were still assigned lower-paying
positions than corresponding white employees, income disparities were
much smaller in companies with formal affirmative action guidelines.' 9
Today, employers recognize that affirmative action programs prevent
them from eliminating qualified applicants, or losing qualified employ-
ees."0 This study supports the conclusion that affirmative action has
improved the status of women in the workforce.
women, having had more opportunity and access necessary to successful rainmaking than
women. Eleanor M. Fox, Being a Woman, Being a Lawyer and Being a Human
Being-Women and Change, 57 FORDHAM L. REv. 955 (1989). See also, Zeldis,
Rainmaking at Law Firms: The Last Hurdle for Women, N.Y. L.J., May 1, 1989, at 1. col.
3.
105. CLAYTON & CROSBY, supra note 104, at 98. A 1981 study by the Office of
Federal Contract Compliance Programs showed far greater percentages ofwomen and non-
white men employed by federal contractors subject to affirmative action requirements than
by non-contractor establishments. Id. Between 1974 and 1980 employment of minorities
and women by federal contractors substantially increased (20% and 150o, respectively),
while non-contractors showed a smaller increase of minority hiring (12%) and almost no
change in the employment of women (a 2% increase). Id.
106. One significant case of sexual discrimination at the University of Minnesota
evinces the impact of affirmative action. Originally filed in 1973, the case was expanded
to a class action in 1975 and settled in 1980 after the University instituted an affirmative
action program. The plan established policies for hiring and promoting women that
included goals and timetables for each department and a rule that equally qualified female
candidates would be given preference. Between 1979 and 1989, the percentage of women
administrators increased from 26% to 54%. In 1979, female faculty earned 77% of what
men earned; ten years later they earned 81%. Id. at 98-99.
107. Id. at 99.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. Indeed, companies have come to realize that affirmative action programs can
be designed to benefit the company as well as the target group. Avon Chairman James
Preston has stated that "managing diversity is not something we do because it is nice but
because it is in our interest." Id. at 127.
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V. CONCLUSION
Despite these advances, affirmative action has only begun to remedy
the disparity between males and females in the workforce."' Affirma-
tive action must continue until true equality is reached and women are
fully integrated into the workforce. To reach this goal, however,
affirmative action programs implemented only to correct past discrimina-
tion is not sufficient. Instead, management must develop proactive
programs. Employers implementing affirmative action programs must
not only monitor their ongoing operations, they must also respond to and
correct problems that arise. In addition, employers must encourage
diversity in the workplace by educating all their employees, supporting
all the minority employees, and helping each employee maximize their
potential regardless of their sex." 2
In Adarand, the Supreme Court applied the strict scrutiny to all
federal, state, and local governmental race-based affirmative action
programs. Applying strict scrutiny set out in Adarand to gender-based
affirmative action programs will only impede or reverse the accomplish-
ments achieved thus far. Instead, the courts should give deference to
these programs. Although parties oppose affirmative action pro-
grams,"' the public would support these programs if they received an
11l. See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
112. See Elizabeth M. Fowler, Managing a Diverse Work Force, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10,
1990, at 17D. Many companies have implemented creative programs to support and
promote diversity. Id. These programs often include role-playing, sharing personal
experiences, engaging in open discussions to expose managers to the subtle dimensions of
prejudice and stereotypes, and helping managers deal with race- or gender-related
differences in business behavior. Id. Some companies develop race- or gender-based
support networks. Id.
113. In an insightful analogy, author Eleanor Holmes Norton addresses the
disagreement over the necessity of affirmative action programs by comparing them to the
procedures of electing political representatives in the United States. She states that voting
purports to be the process through which citizens elect politicians who will represent their
point of view, yet voter turnout continues to drop, distrust of politicians increases, and
most people agree that elections have become too much like popularity contests where the
candidates try not so much to express their own positions to the voters as to say whatever
will win them votes. However, few would advocate abolishing elections because the
democratic process necessitates voting. Likewise, she argues that affirmative action is
necessary even if it does not always operate perfectly. SUSAN D. CLAYTON, JUSTICE,
GENDER, AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 3 (1992). Alternatively, James Scanlan, a lawyer
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, argues for an end to gender-based
affirmative action based on lack of necessity. Scanlan argues that although certain factors
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explanation of these programs and if they received information regarding
the inequalities that exist between the sexes.
Through the implementation of affirmative action, the application of
intermediate scrutiny and the improvement of diversity education, the
notion of any disparity between the sex will cease. In order for change
to occur, there must be a change in how people feel, behave and respond
to other human beings regardless of their gender. Without such change,
the nation's journey towards equal opportunity will be unending.
Rebecca L. Berkeley"
may justify minority based affirmative action programs, they do not justify gender-based
programs. Id. Specifically, Scanlan contends that minorities are disproportionately
affected by the economic circumstances of other members of their minority group with
whom they share their economic situation-blood relations and spouses-are also
minorities. Id. Thus, a reduction in low-paying jobs tends to mitigate the total impact of
poverty. Id. In contrast, Scanlan claims that the economic circumstances of other women
do not effect women as a group any more than the economic circumstances of men. Id.
Thus, because women do not disproportionately share their economic situation with other
women, reducing female unemployment will not lessen the impact of poverty. Id. Scanlan
points to this factor as strong evidence for eliminating set-asides based on gender. Id.
* J.D. 1996, Washington University.
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